CfP- Special Issue on Guarantees of Non-Repetition through Constitutional Reform in TJ

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Oxford University Press - deadline for submissions July 1, 2026

While transitional justice has long centred on truth commissions, prosecutions, and reparations, far less attention has been devoted to mechanisms designed to prevent the recurrence of mass violence, repression, and human rights violations. Guarantees of non-repetition (GNR) occupy an important yet relatively underexplored place within the field.

Unlike measures aimed at redressing past harms, GNRs are forward-looking measures which focus on transforming the structural and institutional conditions that made those harms possible. Among these measures, constitutional reforms, whether undertaken through the adoption of new Constitutions, the creation of interim frameworks, or the enactment of profound amendments, represent a powerful but insufficiently studied instrument of prevention. This special issue aims to address this gap by examining how constitutional reforms can function as GNR mechanisms by restructuring power relations, protecting fundamental rights, redefining political community, and incorporating safeguards capable of deterring future abuses.

Over the past decades, constitutional reform processes in transitional contexts have taken numerous forms. They have been adopted during or after periods of repression and mass violence, and have followed peace agreements, regime collapses, or international interventions. Some of these reforms emerged from revolutionary ruptures that entailed radical breaks with the past and sought to establish new constitutional orders; others resulted from negotiations characterised by compromise and power-sharing. In some cases, reforms produced entirely new constitutional documents articulating a shared vision of the future; in others, they took the form of interim arrangements or targeted amendments to existing Constitutions designed to accommodate diverse political and social interests. Practice has shown that there is no single model for constitutional transformation in transitional settings.

When designed inclusively, constitutional reforms can promote coexistence, rebuild social trust, secure fundamental rights, including gender equality and minority protections, and establish durable institutional safeguards. Throughout their design, they can embed the principle of ‘never again’ at the core of public life. Conversely, exclusionary, or politically biased reforms may reinforce societal divisions, legitimise illiberal regimes, undermine democratic legitimacy, and even trigger renewed conflicts.

Against this backdrop, we welcome contributions that bridge transitional justice, constitutional law, and peace and conflict studies to assess the conditions under which constitutional reforms, whether in the form of new Constitutions, amendments, or interim constitutional frameworks, can prevent the recurrence of atrocity, repression, promote social cohesion, and sustain lasting peace. Submissions that examine both the potential and the inherent limitations of constitutional reform as a GNR mechanism are especially encouraged. By focusing on GNR, this special issue aims to advance our understanding of how constitutional reform can help societies rebuild political communities after violence or authoritarianism, offering important insights into the promise and limits of Constitutions as instruments of ‘never again’.

We particularly encourage analyses grounded in feminist, postcolonial, decolonial, Indigenous, critical race, and other transformative critical perspectives, as well as submissions that integrate theory and practice. Contributions may include case studies worldwide, comparative analysis, and practical recommendations for constitutional design. Multidisciplinary approaches, contributions from the Global South, practitioner–academic collaborations, and positionality or methodological reflections are strongly encouraged.

Potential lines of inquiry

We invite theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented contributions that engage with, but are not limited to, the following themes:

• What is the relationship between constitutionalism, transitional justice, and GNR, both from the theoretical and practical perspectives?

• How can we conceptualise the role of constitutional reform within transitional justice frameworks, and how should GNR be situated within broader debates on institutional reform, peacebuilding, and democratisation?

• What are the risks of illiberal constitutional frameworks, symbolic rather than substantive reforms, and the manipulation of “never again” rhetoric for authoritarian legitimation?

• What are the risks of erasure or selective remembrance in foundational texts?

• How does the strength or weakness of constitutional culture affect the effectiveness of reforms in achieving GNR?

• How do historical narratives and symbolic constitutional provisions promote or obstruct reconciliation in transitional contexts?

• How are GNR embedded in constitutional texts, for example, through entrenchment of rights, institutional reform clauses, lustration and vetting provisions, or recognition of past wrongs, and what does this unveil about the relationship between constitutionalism and the prevention of future abuses?

• To what extent do power-sharing mechanisms embedded in constitutional frameworks contribute to preventing the recurrence of violence?

• To what extent and in what ways do constitutional reform processes address or overlook the rights of minorities, women, ethnic groups, Indigenous Peoples, LGBTQI+ communities, and other marginalised groups, and how does inclusivity (or its absence) affect peacebuilding and reconciliation?

• What can comparative or case-study analyses of constitutional reform in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings tell us about the successes, challenges, and unintended consequences of constitutional reform?

• To what extent do truth commissions and other transitional justice mechanisms offer guidance or recommendations relevant to constitutional reform?

• What role have interim constitutions played in advancing or inhibiting transitional justice and facilitating constitutional reform or the adoption of new Constitutions?

• How do peace agreements interact with constitutional reforms, and what issues arise concerning their legitimacy, implementation, and possible supra-constitutional status?

• What role does the international community, including institutions such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the African Union, or the Inter-American system, play in shaping constitutional reform processes, and what are the potential benefits and risks of externally driven models?

Guest Editors:

Elisenda Calvet-Martínez is an Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Barcelona (Spain) and Carna Pistan is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Centre for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development, a research partnership between the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe and the University of Bologna (Italy).

For specific questions about potential submissions, please contact the Special Issue guest editors at elisendacalvet@ub.edu / cpistan@jhu.edu.

Submission deadline

July 1, 2026

Submission Guidelines:

Word limit: 5,000–10,000 words

Abstracts: >150 words

Referencing style: Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition

Peer review: Double-blind review, with decisions communicated within three months of submission

Anticipated publication: 2027

For further details on author guidelines, please refer to the General Instructions page.